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Abstract
This study investigates the usage of road networks both within and outside of
home jurisdictions (city (or town) and county of residence) by analyzing GPS data
collected in the Minneapolis - Saint Paul metropolitan area, which tracked volunteers’
travel behavior to determine which roads (and thus which class of roads) users chose
to accommodate their travel needs. More than half of the travel on county roads and
city streets occur outside of one’s home city, but most travel is within one’s home
county. The average share of travel distance in the home county is more than 70%
for both county and city streets. The high share, which does not even account for
non-residents destined for the county to work or shop, e.g., implies that the free rider
problem on city and county streets at the county level is minimal. Of particular con-
cern is travel on city roads in cities other than one’s own. To the extent that this is
to go to a destination in that city, that travel is also local. However, because city and
county roads are typically funded by those jurisdictions from land-based sources such
as property taxes, through trips with neither end in the city through which they are
traveling are in a very real sense “free riders”, and pose a problem. With growing trip
lengths and emerging economies of scale in road management, it may be appropriate
to consider moving more roads from township, town, or city level to the county level
of government.
Keywords:Transportation ﬁnancing, GPS, road utilization, hierarchy of roads, transporta-
tion governance
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11 Introduction
Should the federal, state, or municipal government be accountable for ﬁnancing, build-
ing, operating, or maintain a particular road? Both road networks and governments are
typically hierarchically organized. However, the nature and degree of hierarchy varies.
Governing a network link by a jurisdiction that is inappropriately small (or inappropri-
ately large) adds costs avoidable by associating the infrastructure with the most appro-
priate layer of government.
Highways and streets serve two distinct functions: through movement and land access,
respectively. The hierarchy of roads separates these functions to achieve several beneﬁts
(and incur several related costs):
 Aggregates trafﬁc to achieve economies of scale in construction and operation, a
particular advantage for expensive, limited-access facilities. Aggregation makes the
construction of grade separations feasible, for instance.
 Reduces trafﬁc conﬂicts by separating the access and movement function.
 Maintainsthedesiredquietcharacterofresidentialneighborhoodsbykeepingthrough
trafﬁc away from homes (but doing so increases travel distance).
 Contains less redundancy, and so may be less costly to build (but more vulnerable
and less robust).
 Eases efﬁcient network ﬁnancing by enabling excludability associated with higher
levels and the separability associated with each layer. In economic terms, the top
level is potentially a competitive market good, while the bottom level is a public or
club good.
In North America, the hierarchy of roads emerged early in the eighteenth century with
the division of roads into Great (or Kings) Highways and Common Highways. Great
Highways were under the authority of a colony’s Governor and Council, while Common
Highways were managed more locally by appointed commissioners or the county court
upon presentment of a grand jury or petition (Durrenberger, 1931). Similarly today, roads
serving longer-distance trips are generally controlled by a higher jurisdiction than those
tending to serve shorter-distance trafﬁc.
Political jurisdictions in the United States range from homeowner associations at the low-
est level, through townships, towns, or cities to counties, to states and then the federal
government at the highest level. Different layers of government typically have different
functions: A homeowners’ association may manage common property and driveways; a
township may provide township roads; a county provides medium sized roads; while the
state retains large roads. The federal government shares revenue among states providing
a large share of funding for major transportation projects (such as Interstate Highways).
2Which level of government should manage or regulate which level of the network? Or,
more precisely, where should the lines be drawn between roads managed by municipal,
county, and state governments respectively?
Surprisingly, there has been little attention paid to the question of correspondence be-
tween the locality of travel and road ownership. This may have been due partly to the
absence of a perceived problem with existing structures of local road ﬁnance. Another
reason why this question may not have been posed previously is the lack of adequate
data. Until recently, travel behavior data sets have been predominantly trip-based and
not sufﬁciently detailed to capture complex patterns of urban travel.
To bridge this gap, this study investigates the usage of road networks both within and
outside of home jurisdictions (city (or town) and county of residence) by analyzing GPS
data collected in the Minneapolis - Saint Paul metropolitan area, which tracked volun-
teers’ travel behavior to determine which roads (and thus which class of roads) users
chose to accommodate their travel needs. Speciﬁc attention is given to travel off of the
principal arterial network.
This study complements previous work which tried to establish the optimal mix be-
tween state and county funding based on minimizing economic costs (Levinson and
Yerra, 2002). Instead of considering cost distribution, this study examines utilization.
The next section summarizes current funding arrangements. The underlying theory of
correspondence between jurisdiction of residence and jurisdiction of provision is pre-
sented. Then the paper describes the study area and detail of the GPS data. The amount
of travel occurred on different classes of roads managed by different jurisdictions is then
analyzed. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications to transportation
ﬁnance that can be derived from this study.
2 Current funding arrangements
The mixed experience of alternative funding mechanisms indicates that any revenue
source trades off between administrative efﬁciency, equity, political acceptability, etc.
There is no universal best mix of funds, it depends very much on the context of the
speciﬁc place and time. Current transportation funding is a mix of federal, state, local
sources, and a mix of user, non-user beneﬁciary, and general public revenue sources. Fig-
ure 1 shows United States average and Minnesota transportation funding for state and
local governments. As can be seen from the ﬁgures, while large parts come from user fees
collected at the state level, local transportation funding largely depends on local general
funds (which are often property tax based) as well as speciﬁc dedications from property
taxes. Each state differs in this allocation, but the general pattern remains that many
funds, especially for local transportation, are funded based on property value rather than
user fees. Nationally the ratio of state to local funding is about 2:1, while in Minnesota,
3the ratio is closer to 1:1.
Financing arrangements adopted by local jurisdictions in the United States (primarily
cities, but also counties) that rely heavily on property taxes or other local, broad-based
taxes implicitly assume that most travel on the roads in these jurisdictions is local in
nature. If this assumption holds, then most of the beneﬁts from local roads accrue to
local residents and it is reasonable to impose charges on these residents to ﬁnance the
roads. The property tax is collected in any case, so using an existing revenue source is
administratively efﬁcient for local governments. If this assumption does not hold, there
may be a substantial amount of free-riding by travelers on local networks outside their
home jurisdiction.
3 Service areas and the correspondence problem
A service area is deﬁned as the area from which all trips on a link either originate or for
which they are destined, whichever trip end is closer (Levinson, 2002). The service area
concept is illustrated Figure 2, in which the city in the upper right hand corner is the
service area for the city road it surrounds. The county is the service area for the larger
county road it contains. This particular ﬁgure is idealized (though the use of circular
roads and the absence of through streets). The real world is quite a bit messier.
While all trafﬁc originating in or destined for its service area is by deﬁnition local, the term
local is relative as that local area may be large for facilities at the top of the hierarchy, links
that serve long-distance trips.
For any size jurisdiction, the share of local (own-jurisdiction originating or destined) traf-
ﬁc is highest on streets lower in the hierarchy. In the illustration, 100 percent of City Road
trafﬁc was local to the City, but only a fraction of County Road trafﬁc was local to the
city. That fraction depends on the amount of through trafﬁc and within-city trafﬁc using
County Road. If there is no through trafﬁc, all trafﬁc on the County Road is local to the
City.
Thereason fordeﬁning aservice areais todetermine theappropriate geographyfor trans-
portation management (and consequently ﬁnancing) for a given facility. This is especially
important when users cannot be charged directly. It seems clear that if there is a geog-
raphy to which a link should be assigned, it should be based on the origin and desti-
nation of trips using that link. Further, it seems clear that a host pays rule, where the
nearest trip-end plays host, is practical compared with its alternatives: guest pays or split
the bill. Guest pays involves billing the individual (or, more speciﬁcally, the jurisdiction
in which he lives) from the farther zone, which would mean collecting revenue and in-
volving decision-makers from many zones rather than a few. This is traditionally used to
pay for land-line telephone calls, where the caller pays. A split the bill rule involves more





























































































































































Figure 1: Transportation funding in the United States and Minnesota









Figure 2: Network service areas corresponding to jurisdictions Ideal Model of Hierarchy
6regardless of how small. This is used in mobile-phone billing. While the nearest zone is
spatially concentrated with many users, the farther zones each have only a few users, but
there are many such zones. Because there is a general symmetry in trip-making (each trip
has two ends, most trips are round trips, and both parties at a trip-end receive beneﬁts
(employer/employee, vendor/customer), adopting a host pays rules should work out to
be approximately fair. One can imagine problems (unwanted traveling salesmen, for ex-
ample), but this is seemingly a small issue (compared with, say, unwanted telemarketers).
One difﬁculty with host pays is the multiplicity of hosts. For a street, is the appropriate
host the local neighborhood association, municipality, county, or state? Some share of
trafﬁc on the street is local to each of those jurisdictions.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) provide an argument in favor of local and decentralized
decision-making. They suggest that larger governments are more subject to logrolling
(parliamentary vote-trading). In logrolling, the traded votes are for projects of purely
local interest, that is, ’pork barrel’ projects. Overspending results from allowing these
local projects to be funded more globally. The costs are diffuse over the entire population,
while the beneﬁts are concentrated. So the incentive for getting the larger community to
pay for a local project is high, particularly so when other local areas are playing the same
game.
Logrolling is common in democracies, and can be reduced by making government more
local so that for instance, only the beneﬁciaries of a project pay for it. For example, a rule
could be formulated that road segments are assigned to the smallest jurisdiction on which 50
percent of trips are locally originating or destined. The appropriate percentage could still be
debated.
This paper examines the actual percentage of local trafﬁc for jurisdictions in Minnesota
beginning with the next section. Comparing the actual level with the most efﬁcient level
is important to know if and how public policy about which jurisdictions control which
roads should change. This answer is not static, as transportation links increase in speed,
we would expect they be upgraded in ownership as well (Xie and Levinson, 2009). The
most efﬁcient level is also an empirical question, trading off costs of higher levels of gov-
ernment such as logrolling against economies of scale.
Another alternative would be to establish new government or management organizations
for roads to improve ﬁt, but this runs the risk of increasing the oversight burden for those
who now have to monitor multiple single-issue government agencies (which is common
in some areas) rather than monitor fewer, multiple-issue agencies. Table 1 summarizes
the basic hypotheses that are suggested when a lower or higher level of government man-
ages roads that serve short- or long-distance trips. The mismatch of the jurisdiction with
the appropriate public issue is often called the Correspondence Problem.
Advantages and disadvantages to managing roads under a higher jurisdiction are listed
below, extending and summarizing (Levinson, 2002).:
7 Beneﬁts
– Alargerjurisdictionismoreabletoachievethevariouskindsofscaleeconomies.
– The chain of governance is clearer the fewer governmental layers there are.
– Inter-jurisdictional welfare loss in decision-making, and gouging of neighbors
with excessive tolls is eliminated (Levinson, 2002).
 Costs
– Larger jurisdictions have a larger span of control, which increases management
costs and slows decision times.
– Decisions are made remotely with less information about site-speciﬁc circum-
stances (Hayek, 2001), the principalagent problem is worsened in this circum-
stance as government is farther from the people
– Logrolling costs lead to overinvestment (or perhaps underpricing).
– Innovation loss, as fewer experiments can be run when there are fewer com-
peting independent governments operating.
– Productdifferentiationisdiminished(intheTieboutHypothesissense(Tiebout,
1956)), as there are fewer combinations of taxes and differentiated public ser-
vices provided to allow taxpaying consumers to choose alternative jurisdic-
tions.
– Higher jurisdictions are more likely to use tax ﬁnancing rather than tolls, which
makes congestion pricing more difﬁcult to implement (Levinson, 2002).
Table 1: Correspondence Problem with Logrolling
Short-distance road Long-distance road
Municipal government Fair and efﬁcient Underinvest or overprice
State government Overinvest or underprice Fair and efﬁcient
4 GPS Data
This study focuses on the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area (Seven County) which contains
7 counties and 190 cities. Figure 3 presents the jurisdiction boundaries and major roads in
the region. We are interested in the question of how much travel takes place by jurisdic-
tion and class of roads. To answer this question, this study employs GPS data collected
during a travel behavior study after the I-35W Bridge collapse (Zhu et al., 2010). The
8objective of the GPS-based study is to capture commuters’ travel behavior through lon-
gitudinal observations of travel choices participants made during the opening the I-35W
replacement bridge. Subjects were randomly selected among more than 1000 respondents
to our recruiting announcements posted through different media, including Craigslist and
City Pages, ﬂyers at grocery stores, ﬂyers at city libraries, postcards handed out in down-
town parking ramps, and emails to more than 7000 University of Minnesota staff (stu-
dents and faculty were excluded).
The home and work locations of all subjects are also indicated in Figure 3. The subjects’
home locations spread widely across the region, though their work locations concentrate
in the downtown Minneapolis and the University of Minnesota campus. Since this study
focuses on the association between the locality of travel and home jurisdiction, we believe
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Figure 3: The study area and the home and work locations of study subjects
GPS devices were installed in the vehicles of subjects and monitored their trajectories dur-
ing a study period lasting from 8 to 13 weeks. Excluding cases affected by device failure
or early exit from the study, data from 140 subjects were collected. Two different technolo-
gies were used. Vehicles of 97 subjects were equipped with logging Global Positioning
9System (GPS) devices (QSTARZ BT-Q1000p GPS Travel Recorder powered by DC output
from in-vehicle cigarette lighter), which recorded locations along the vehicle trajectory
every 25 meters. A more reliable (and pricier) GPS data collection system developed by
Professor Randall Guensler of the Georgia Institute of Technology and the subcontractor
Vehicle Monitoring Technologies (VMTINC) was adopted for 43 subjects, which trans-
mitted a second by second position log to the Atlanta-based server in real time through
wireless communication systems.
Algorithms are developed to convert position log data from both sources into trip infor-
mation under ArcGIS. Details of this process is described in (Zhu et al., 2010). The link
sequence of a trip is built to ﬁnding the nearest link of a trajectory point that:
 is consistent with travel direction of previous and subsequent points,
 generates reasonable travel speed, and
 connects logically with upstream and downstream links.
Since we focused on the 7 county Twin Cities area (Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey,
Scott, Washington, and Carver Counties) , potential subjects who live outside of the study
area (e.g. in the 13 “collar county” area, including parts of Wisconsin) were excluded.
Long-distance travel that leaves the study area is also excluded.
Home addresses were provided by study participants. They are digitized in ArcGIS and
veriﬁed visually by comparing with GPS data. The home county and home city of each
subject is identiﬁed by overlaying their home locations and the digital map of political
boundaries (thereby determining their township, town, or city (or if they live in an unin-
corporated area) as well as their county and state - Minnesota).
5 Network
A detailed network conﬂated to the real road geometry (The TLG network 1), is used in
this study. It covers the 7-county Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and is the most accurate
GIS network map to date. The original TLG network contains both two-directional and
one-directional links. In order to be consistent with geo-coding conventions of planning
network, all two-directional links are converted into two links (one in each direction).
The modiﬁed TLG network contains 290,231 links, providing an accurate description of
the entire Twin Cities network to the street level.
The functional class of road feature separates the TLG road ﬁles. The functional classes
consist of A10 Interstate Freeways, A15 Interstate HOV lanes (I-394 HOV), A20 US
1The TLG network is generated and maintained by the Metropolitan Council and The Lawrence Group
(Craig, 2005)
10Highways, A25 State Highways, A30 County Road, A40 City Street, A63 Ramps and
Loops, and A64 Service Drives. Ramps and loops are not treated independently and
instead are regrouped to the corresponding road classes in this study.
There are 190 cities within the seven-county metropolitan area. Jurisdictional fragmenta-
tion has lead to numerous agencies building, operating, and maintaining different func-
tional classes of roads. Classes A30 (County Road) and A40 (City Street), are speciﬁcally
examined for the purpose of this study. The objective is to evaluate the extent to which
travel on low level roads is local in nature.
6 Locality of travel
By skimming the network according the link sequences previously derived and compar-
ing the satellite time recorded in GPS data, we evaluate the total travel that take places
on different road functional classes by both time and distance. Figure 4 summarizes the
share of vehicle distance and hours on different roads for weekdays and weekends. For
weekday commuters in our study, 38% of all travel in distance is on Interstate highway.
Other state highways represents only 22% of travel in distance. The share of travel dis-
tance is greater on fast roads, while the share of travel time is unsurprisingly greater on
slow roads. Weekends show similar patterns, with about 4% less interstate travel. The
share of Interstate highway VKT from this study is higher than the 23.9% cited by Wachs
(2003) from Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Statistics. Since subjects in our
study live mostly in suburban areas, and all were commuters, it is not surprising to see a
heavier use of Interstates.
Figure 5 summarizes the average percentage of travel distance that takes place in one’s
home county and city among all subjects. Considering the relatively large size of the
county, it is not surprising to ﬁnd out that most people make the majority of travel in
their home county (local in nature), regardless of road classes. The average share of VKT
in the home county is more than 70% for both county and city streets. The high share,
which does not even account for non-residents destined for the county to work or shop,
e.g., implies that the free rider problem on city and county streets at the county level is
minimal.
On average, only about 42% of VKT on county roads takes places in one’s home city. Only
half of the travel on city streets is in one’s own city. Although the average percentage
of travel in home city is much lower for Interstate highway (23%), US highway (9%),
and State highway (21%). Figure 6 shows the distribution of travel on county and city
roads, there is a wide variance, both because of very different travel behaviors across
individuals, as well as differences in the nature of city and county road networks.
Not all non-local travel is detrimental to system efﬁciency with land-based ﬁnancing be-






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Histogram of subjects according to the percentage of travel in one’s home city
14round trips, and both parties at a trip-end receive beneﬁts (employer/employee, ven-
dor/customer), adopting a host pays rules should work out to be approximately fair. Of
particular concern is the Through Trafﬁc with neither end in the city or county through
which they are traveling. These travelers are in a very real sense “free riders” since no
value can be captured through activities/people at both ends of the trip (e.g. taxes paid
by vendors or employers, or friends they visit). Figure 7 summarizes the share of pure
through trafﬁc, measured by VKT taking place in one city (or county) which hosts nei-
ther end of the trip. The share of through trafﬁc is relatively low for county, which is not
surprising given the relative large size of counties. The problem of “free riders” is more
signiﬁcant for cities. About 22% and 13% trafﬁc on county roads and city streets, respec-
tively, is through trafﬁc. Although the share is much higher for interstate highways, US
















Figure 7: Through trafﬁc on different road classes by city and county (measured in VKT)
7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the extent to which travel is localized across the hier-
archy of roads, using GPS-based data on a group of subjects’ travel in both time and
distance on various types of functional classes of roads. More than half of the travel on
15county roads and city streets occur outside of one’s home city, but most travel is within
one’s home county. Of particular concern is travel on city roads in cities other than one’s
own. To the extent that this is to go to a destination in that city, that travel is also lo-
cal. However, because city and county roads are typically funded by those jurisdictions
from land-based sources such as property taxes, trips with neither end in the city through
which they are traveling are in a very real sense “free riders”, and pose a problem. That
problem can be solved in various ways: reclassifying the road to a higher jurisdiction,
changing municipal road ﬁnance to be use-based rather than land-based, making other
routes more desirable, or making that road less desirable for traveling. Each of those
alternatives raise new sets of problems.
Despite some free-riding problem, the current structure of local road ﬁnance has many
useful features. Local forms of taxation, like property taxes and special assessments, are
relatively easy and inexpensive to administer. As the current study has indicated, a large
share of travel seems to be quite localized, with the implication that the users are broadly
representative of those who bear the tax burden. Also, with some modiﬁcations to ﬁ-
nancing arrangements, issues with temporal and spatial free-riding can be minimized
(e.g. Levinson (2005)).
There are also shortcomings to this approach. To the extent that local roads suffer con-
gestion (and some collectors and minor arterials surely do), ﬁxed charges will not be of
much use in managing congestion. The price signal to users regarding the cost of road
provision is weak. Likewise, the efﬁciency argument for property tax ﬁnancing is weak
in the case of heavy vehicles, which may impose disproportionately higher damage costs.
Finally, the ability to charge through-trips is effectively prohibited.
There is a need to periodically reconsider how governance of roads is arranged. With
growing trip lengths and emerging economies of scale in road management, it may be
appropriate to consider moving more roads from township, town, or city level to the
county level of government. There is not a universal rule for such a movement, but useful
heuristics can be developed with further research.
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